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DISCUSSION
Schrems – Towards a High 
Standard of Data 
Protection for European 
Citizens
It has been almost six weeks since the ECJ handed down its 
groundbreaking Schrems judgment. This post reflects upon 
the institutional practices and scholarly discussion following 
the judgment. The Court held the transfer of data to the US 
based on the Commission’s safe harbor decision illegal as it 
violates the essence of the right to privacy. It refrained from 
setting a grace period. As the judgment concerns many large 
companies, one might have expected to notice the practical 
consequences by now. By reflecting on the institutional 
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implementation of the judgment, it becomes more clear why 
we have not yet noticed the judgment in our day-to-day 
Facebook, Google, Apple, and Microsoft life.
While applauded by the general public, the judgment has 
been received more critically in scholarly blogs. In 
particular, some argued that the ECJ was not democratically 
legitimized to render the judgment. However, the criticism 
fails to convince. The deficiencies of the democratic process 
in protecting the rights of European citizens called for 
judicial interference.
The Hesitant Implementation and its Discontents 
In general, personal data from European citizens can only be 
transferred to a third country if this country guarantees an 
adequate level of data protection. The Commission had set 
up a complex mechanism known as safe harbor decision to 
allow for the transfer of data to certain US companies. As 
long as the companies stated to comply with certain privacy 
principles, the transfer was considered to be legal in light of 
the adequate standard of protection. The Court invalidated 
this decision in Schrems. Are all transfers to US companies 
therefore illegal?
Relying on the safe harbor decision is only one means to 
transfer data to third countries legally. Article 26 of the Data 
Protection Directive allows derogations from the principle. 
Consent, standard contract clauses, and binding corporate 
rules are the most common conditions to make the transfer 
possible to third countries which do not provide for an 
adequate level of protection. Whether these possibilities are 
also affected by the judgment has given rise to an extensive 
debate; the legality of current Facebook data transfers 
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hinges on the outcome of this debate. The ECJ refrained 
entirely from addressing these instruments explicitly. This 
has been criticized. In light of the reference, however, the 
ECJ could not extend its judgment to these instruments; 
therefore, it acted correctly in exercising restraint.
The implementation of the judgment is now left to the data 
protection authorities. The so-called Article 29 Working 
Group has by now issued a statement on the 
implementation. This Working Group is the coordinating 
body for the national data protection authorities. The Group 
sets a grace period until January 2016 deviating from the 
ECJ. Apart from this, the declaration is kept very vague. The 
opinions of the national data protection authorities on the 
implications of Schrems on consent, standard contract 
clauses and binding corporate rules seem to diverge 
immensely. The authorities merely state that they will 
continue to analyze the judgment’s impact on these other 
instruments for transfer. According to the statement 
standard contract clauses and binding corporate rules can 
still be used as long as the authorities investigate their 
legality. The German data protection authorities take a 
slightly different approach: they state that the judgment has 
cast doubt on the other instruments. They will therefore, for 
the time being, not issue any new permissions for standard 
contract clauses and binding corporate rules.
It hardly seems conceivable to legally transfer data to the US 
based on standard contract clauses or binding corporate 
rules. Article 26 para 3 of the Directive states that 
fundamental rights must be respected when national data 
protection authorities grant permissions to companies. 
Companies would need to shield the transferred data from 
access by the US government, whereas US law requires the 
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companies to grant access. Considering that in Schrems the 
ECJ found a violation of the essence of the right to privacy, 
transferring data on the basis of standard contract clauses 
or binding corporate rules violates European fundamental 
rights.
The only possibility left for a legal data transfer is therefore 
individual consent. Valid consent according to the Directive 
needs to meet strict requirements. General clauses as 
contained in the terms of Facebook and the like fail to 
comply with this standard (see Max Schrems for a short 
overview of the clauses). The precise requirements for valid 
consent are not yet settled and remain disputed among the 
data protection authorities. It is now up to the Irish Data 
Protection Authority to investigate whether the transfer in 
the case of Schrems was legal. As Ireland is not known for a 
high standard of data protection, we might end up with yet 
another ECJ case, this time on the feasibility of transfers 
based on clauses or consent.
The Democratic Critique and its Discontents  
The judgment has been fiercely criticized for lacking 
democratic credentials. In an inspiring and witty post, 
Russell Miller has attacked the “god-like judicial power”. 
According to him, the reaction to the Snowden leaks ought 
to be left to the political institutions, particularly as national 
security issues are at stake.
There is indeed a worrying European trend towards 
debating central political decisions not in parliament but in 
court. Russell, however, picked the wrong judgment for his 
critique. The Schrems judgment was democratically 
legitimate.
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The criticism misconstrues the judgment. It is presented as a 
judgment invalidating under all circumstances data 
collection by US authorities. The intensive debate on the 
other instruments for transfer shows that the discussion is 
far from over. The judgment is, therefore, far more 
restrained than the critics contend.
The legitimacy of constitutional courts has been subject to 
intensive debate. Representation reinforcement is still the 
leading scholarly concept. According to this theory, courts 
are justified to interfere whenever deficiencies in the 
democratic process occur. It is the task of constitutional 
courts to ensure that the democratic process is sufficiently 
inclusive. From a European perspective, the US legislative 
process concerning data collection by intelligence services 
suffers from severe flaws: while European citizens are 
significantly affected by the legislation, they do not have a 
say in the democratic process. Even after the reforms of the 
USA FREEDOM Act, European citizens lack even basic rights 
in the US. In this situation it seems more than legitimate for 
the ECJ to intervene on behalf of the European citizens. 
Furthermore, the ECJ did not act in a democratic vacuum. It 
is telling that the critics do not mention the European 
Parliament’s call to end safe harbor. In the European 
institutional balance, the ECJ uses the judgment to support 
parliamentary responses to the Snowden leaks. Is that really 
illegitimate given the current state of European democracy?
Additionally, rights can legitimize the action of 
constitutional courts. It is convincing to primarily leave the 
balancing of rights to parliaments. Cases of violations of the 
essence of a right, however, are prime examples of a 
situation in which courts ought to interfere. Critics might 
question whether the essence was really at stake in Schrems. 
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The ECJ has been careful to limit the essence (para 94): the 
essence of the privacy right is only violated if access 
concerns the content instead of “merely” meta-data. 
Furthermore, the essence is only affected if the law granting 
access fails to set limits entirely. For example, the ECJ did 
not find a violation of the privacy right’s essence in its 
judgment Digital Rights Ireland concerning data retention.
The actions required by the US are anything but impossible. 
In the USA FREEDOM Act, the US has limited the access of 
intelligence services to data by US citizens. Extending that 
act to European citizens would bring US legislation closer to 
complying with the European standard. Is it too much to ask 
for US legislation not to discriminate against Europeans?
The ECJ hence convincingly protected the rights of 
European citizens. The judgment will keep lawyers occupied 
for some time. The Commission announced that it wants to 
negotiate a new safe harbor regime within three months. 
Will the US agree to effectively protect the rights of 
European citizens? Furthermore, the information revealed 
by Snowden has shown that the UK collects data without 
distinction. Will anyone dare to challenge the UK’s 
intelligence services and its 007 agents in times of BREXIT 
fear? Will the next James Bond end with a standoff in 
Luxembourg between judges in robes and secret agents?
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